On 05 May 1999, a five man patrol led by Capt Saurabh Kalia moved across the rugged, mountains of Kaksar, in the Kargil Sector. It was a patrol sent to confirm news of likely Pakistani intrusions in the area and the patrol party was cautious. As they approached the ridgeline adjoining the Line of Control, a movement atop caught their eyes, which was followed by volleys of gunfire. The surprised patrol returned the fire till they ran out of ammunition. Surrounded by Pakistani soldiers – whose presence they, and the rest of the Indian Army were not aware of – they were captured and brutally tortured to death. The first shots of the Kargil War and been fired and had claimed its first casualties.
The ambushing of Capt Kalia’s patrol was the first real indicator of the Pakistani infiltration on the heights adjoining the Indian side of the Line of Control in the Kargil Sector. This 180 kilometer long sector from Kabal Gali in the West to Chorbatla in the East comprised of Dras, (Southwest of Kargil), Kargil and Batalik (to its Northwest) sub-sectors. Its forbidding heights overlooked the National Highway 1D- the critical 2 lane road which was the only line of communication from Srinagar to Leh. Pakistani occupation of these heights meant that they could dominate and cut off India’s lifeline to Ladakh and Siachen.
OPERATION BADR, as the Pakistani plan to occupy the Kargil heights was called, was the brainchild of General Parvez Musharaff, the then Army Chief and later President of Pakistan. The plan was not new and had been put up by earlier Chiefs to President Zia and Benazir Bhutto, only to be rejected. Musharaff, reactivated the plan when he took over as COAS, perhaps as a way to get back to the Indians for their occupation of Siachen. (See ‘The Coldest War’ for Siachen Operations), and to get attention to the Kashmir issue. He himself had been a Brigade Commander in Siachen and the reversals he suffered there must have rankled. Although rehearsals and planning had been going on for over two years, the operation was actually set in motion in November 1998 – ironically at the same time when Prime Ministers Nawaz Sharif and Vajpayee were having their historic meeting at Lahore and talking peace.
The jury is still out as to whether Musharaff consulted his Prime Minister and took him in confidence. As per accounts, he briefed Nawaz Sharif – in vague details – around April 99 when it was already set in motion. From February 1999, troops of the Special Services Group and around seven battalions of the Northern Light Infantry (A paramilitary Regiment which was under, but not a part of the Pakistani Army at that time) began climbing up the heights of the Marpo La Ridgeline in Dras, in Kaksar, near Kargil and Batalik right up to Turtok near Siachen. The Indian posts along the LOC heights were unoccupied in winter and their move was undetected. Strict radio silence was observed, and the move to the heights was done in a gradual phased manner to prevent detection. Pakistani troops were dressed in Salwar kameez, to give the impression that they were mujahidins, so-called freedom-fighters from Kashmir – a stance they maintained till their cover was blown. In fact even within the armed forces, only a handful of people know of the plan, even the Air Force and Navy had not been taken into confidence. This secrecy enabled the early success of the operation, but also led to its eventual unraveling.
Detection and Eviction
The 180 kilometer long Kargil Sector was then occupied by 121 Independent Infantry Brigade with four battalions. The positions had vast gaps between them and in many cases, Indian positions along the heights had been vacated in the winter months. Neither RAW, nor military intelligence had any indication of the gathering storm till a shepherd passed news of armed men in black uniforms at the Kargil heights on 03 May. Reports had started coming in all along the front of activity being detected on the heights and the disappearance of Saurabh Kalia’s patrol on 05 May set alarm bells ringing. On 09 May, shelling from the heights destroyed an ammunition dump at Kargil and Pakistani artillery fire was now targeting traffic on the NH 1D. The scale of the threat now became apparent and on 15 May the Indian Army launched OPERATION VIJAY to evict the Pakistani intrusions in Dras, Kargil, Kaksar and Mushkoh sectors.
The initial attacks to clear the Pakistani positions were disjointed and unprepared. For a long time, the troops were told that it was just a minor intrusion ‘by a few rats’ who had to be thrown out. It was when the first attacks went in, to be met with heavy machine gun, mortar and artillery fire, that it became apparent that this was not a minor intrusion, it was a full scale offensive.
Indian troops moving in
The army may have slipped up in not detecting the intrusions in time, but when it reacted, it moved efficiently. Fortunately the Zoji La pass (the only pass on the Srinagar – Leh road) which was blocked by snow all of winter, opened a month early that year, on 22 April and was useable by 10 May enabling reinforcements to be pumped into the area. Over 200000 troops were mobilized, though only two divisions (3 and 8 Divisions) were committed in the Kargil sector and over 250 guns moved in. Yet while military actions began to retake the heights, there was a caveat. The government had laid down that the LOC was not to be crossed, and operations were not to be initiated in other sectors to prevent escalation of the war. The IAF also launched air operations and the navy began aggressive patrolling of the Arabian Sea to choke Pakistan’s maritime routes, if required. Slowly the wheels of the war machinery were set in motion.
121 Independent Brigade, in whose area this sector fell, was tasked to contain the intrusions while additional troops were pumped in to clear them. The major priority was to evict the Pakistani positions at Tiger Hill and the Tololing Heights which overlooked the NH 1D. The clearing of these heights took over a month and saw the bitterest fighting of the war. In those rarified heights it was not possible to walk 10 steps without pausing for breath and assaults were made in the face of withering fire from above. At these nameless heights – known only by Numbers Point 5410, Point 5432, Point 4100 and so on (which depicted their height above sea level) our officers and men fought and died to recapture them one by one.
The first success of the war came with the securing of Tololing on 13 June. This feature set the stage for the recapture of other positions on the ridgeline. On 4 July, Tiger Hill fell after an 11 hour long battle. All along the front, from Yaldor, Batalik, Kaksar, Kargil and Dras, Indian attacks intensified as they closed in and regained the occupied positions. The news streamed into Indian homes via television, and names like Captain Vikram Batra, Major Rajesh Adhikari, Lieutenant Manoj Pandey, Grenadier Yogendra Singh Yadav, Major Vivek Gupta, Lieutenant Hanifuddin became household names. Battalions that participated in these assaults – 2 RAJRIF, 18 GRENADIERS, 13 JAKRIF, 1/11 GORKHA Rifles, 17 JAT, 8 SIKH and a host of others, became more than numbers. Images of their men standing victoriously with the national flag atop a captured peak imprinted itself on the national psyche.
The IAF too came into the fray. It suffered an initial setback on 27 May when a MIG-27 ‘flamed out’ after a rocket attack (apparently gas fumes from the firing of its rockets were sucked into the engine causing it to stall – a freak occurrence). Its pilot Flight Lieutenant Nachiketa baled out and was taken Prisoner of War. Squadron Leader Ajay Ahuja, flying a MIG 21 fighter on an escort mission overhead, came low to detect where Nachiketa had parachuted and his aircraft was hit by a Stinger missile. Ahuja baled out, but was killed in cold blood by his captors. His body was returned, riddled with bullet wounds.
A day later, on 28 May, a MI-8 helicopter flown by Squadron Leader Rajeev Pundir on a rocket attack mission over the Tololing Heights was hit by a Stinger missile killing all four crew members. The IAF maintained high altitude attacks thereafter, using Mirage 2000s with laser-guided bombs for attacks on Pakistani positions. ‘Dumb’ bombs were also modified for precision bombing but identifying and engaging targets at those heights was virtually impossible. The IAF too had the strict injunction that they could not cross the LOC which in a way obviated encounters with the PAF which could have escalated the war.
Pakistani Withdrawal
By 4 July, the situation was getting critical for Pakistan. The Indian Army was on the offensive and remorselessly recapturing its lost areas, peak by bloody peak. Its artillery, especially the Bofors guns were taking a terrible toll. Although the Indians did not cross the LOC. (The option to cross the LOC and strike at Pakistani bases was considered, but refused) they had interdicted all supplies to the forward troops who were now running out of supplies and ammunition. Casualties were mounting by the day, and the Pakistani Higher Command even refused to take back their dead bodies as it would amount to admitting their involvement. Yet the wounded were pouring into Skardu Base hospital and slowly the news was slowly leaking out of the debacle taking place at these heights.
On 04 July, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif flew to Washington for a meeting with the US President Bill Clinton, in a futile bid for intervention, only to be bluntly told “withdraw your troops.” By then the Indian Army had already recaptured most of the positions in Kargil and Dras and were pushing forward in Batalik and Turtuk as well. Faced with ignoble defeat, the Pakistani started retreating, harassed by artillery fire along the way, leaving their dead behind. The Indian army continued moving forward and by 26 July 1999 – a day marked as Kargil Vijay Diwas – the last position was cleared. Each of the peaks were back in Indian hands.
Castigated by its failure in what has been called ‘Pakistan’s greatest blunder’ and ‘a disaster bigger than East Pakistan’ the Pakistani Army came under increasing criticism. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif laid the onus of the defeat entirely on the Army and relations between him and General Musharaff broke down completely. On 12 Oct Musharaff staged a coup, ousting Sharif and another period of military rule began in Pakistan.
Nor did the story end here. The Kargil saga was only a chapter. Just two months later an Indian MIG 21 shot down a Pakistani Atlantique Reconnaissance aircraft which had intruded into Indian territory in the Rann of Kutch. Two years later, in Dec 2001, the two nations again came to the verge of war after the attack on Indian Parliament by Pakistani sponsored terrorists. The eternal story of Indo-Pak enmity continued as it will for perhaps decades more.