On 13 Oct 1987, around 30 years from now, the Indian Army launched OP PAWAN – a war against the world’s deadliest terrorist group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. The operation began with an ill-fated action to take over the LTTE stronghold of Jaffna and then went on for three grueling, inconclusive years.
Let us go to where it all began. The origins were actually in the early 80s when the Tamil militant t groups intensified their actions against the Sri Lankan government demanding greater autonomy and freedom for the Tamil dominated areas of North and East Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan army launched a vicious crack down and this only led to the resentment. By mid-80s Sri Lanka was in the grip of a civil war. In June 1987, the Sri Lankan Army had besieged Jaffna, where the LTTE leadership was hiding, and had cut off food and supplies to the town. As the suffering to innocent civilians increased and the humanitarian crisis unfolded, the Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, decided to airdrop essential supplies into the town.
On 4 June 1987, five AN-32 aircraft accompanied by MIRAGE 2000 fighters airdropped essential supplies into Jaffna. The show of force had the desired effect. It brought President Jayawardhane to the negotiating table and resulted in the signing of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord. (The ceremony of the signing of the accord had an ugly incident. A Sri Lankan sailor in the Guard of Honour for Rajiv Gandhi hit him with the butt of his rifle to protest Indian interference ) As per the accord, India would provide a Peace Keeping Force to keep the Sri Lankan and the LTTE away from each other, disarm the LTTE and ensure the sovereignty and integrity of Sri Lanka. There was no representative of the LTTE present.
When 54 Infantry Division, the first element of the Indian Peacekeeping Force arrived in Sri Lanka in end June 87, there were no plans for active operations. In fact they did not even carry most of their heavy equipment. It was to be a Peacekeeping Operation after all, but the operation was to soon go awry.
OPERATION PAWAN
Relations between the LTTE and the IPKF were fine initially. But the LTTE did not hand over their weapons (except a few symbolic ones) as they were meant to do. Then in early Oct two LTTE leaders who were in the custody of the Sri Lankan Army committed suicide and the LTTE turned against the IPKF. The IPKF was now tasked to finish the LTTE and capture their stronghold and de-facto capital of Jaffna. With this OPERATION PAWAN was launched.
The first battle of OP PAWAN was the heliborne assault on Jaffna University where the LTTE leadership (including Prabhakaran) were supposedly based. One Para Commando battalion – 10 PARA COMMANDO – and an Infantry Battalion – 13 SIKHLI – were to be heli-dropped inside the Jaffna University grounds hoping to eliminate their leadership and bring an early end to the battle. Two battalions were to move on foot towards Jaffna, enter the town and link up with the commandoes inside. The operation, launched on the night of 12/13 Oct was a disaster. The troops were sent without maps or adequate intelligence and had no idea of either their locations or what awaited them there. Worse, the LTTE had intercepted IPKF radio transmissions and set up machine guns on the roofs of the university buildings. As the helicopters approached and the force began to disembark, the LTTE opened fire, forcing the helicopters to abort their landing and fly back. Only seven helicopters managed to disembark 30 soldiers of 13 SIKHLI and 17 Commandoes from 10 Para Commando. The troops landed on the open grounds of the Jaffna University football fields were mowed down with fire on all sides. In that cruel night 29 of the 30 soldiers of 13 SIKHLI were killed – Sepoy Gora Singh was captured alive and survived to tell the tale. Two Para Commandoes were also killed and the rest holed up inside a university building. On the outskirts of Jaffna, as 4/5 Gurkhas was approaching the town to link up with the helidropped force, they were ambushed and 35 were killed including their Commanding Officer and three officers.
The situation was grave, and none imagined that the LTTE would have been so heavily armed or would have prepared the defences of Jaffna so strongly. It required tanks to finally extricate the trapped Commandoes. The leading tank went over an improvised mine – which was a barrel filled with over 200 kgs of high explosive- and was hurled 30 feet in the air. The roads had been heavily mined and there was no way to get inside. Finally , one troop of tanks accompanied by infantry finally managed to get inside using a railway embankment and extricated the trapped Commandoes from within.
In one night the IPKF had lost 70 men and they realized the Jaffna would be a tough nut to crack. Additional troops were flown in and Jaffna was surrounded from all sides and blockaded from sea by the Indian navy. Marine Commandoes launched two daring raids, destroying LTTE naval craft inside Jaffna Harbour. Slowly the IPKF advanced towards Jaffna, finding mines at virtually every few hundred meters, and facing intensive sniper fire along the way. Finally a foothold was established and then gradually expanded. Fighting took place at every house and street, and the town was cleared, lane by lane, building by building. What should have been a 72 hour operation, took 20 days, and Indian troops gained control of the town only around end November.
LTTE Cadres with Prabhakaran
The Battle for Jaffna was just the start. Most of the LTTE leadership had melted away in to the jungles of Northern and Eastern Sri Lanka. For the next three years, the IPKF waged a slow, difficult battle against the LTTE in the jungles of Batticoloa, Trincomalee and Vavuniya. The LTTE were one of the most dangerous opponents faced by the Indian army. They were excellent guerilla fighters, who were rarely seen, but sniped and fired constantly, and chose to commit suicide by a cyanide pill rather than be captured alive. For three years the slow war continued, without tangible gains. When the IPKF was finally called back by the then Prime Minister V P Singh, there was little to show for it. They had compressed the LTTE in the areas around the jungles of Vavuniya, but the leadership, including Prabhakaran were still alive and at large. They still held on to their bases deep in the jungles and the IPKF lost 1157 officers and men with over 3000 injured. To add insult to injury, when they returned to Chennai, the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister Mr MG Ramachandran refused to receive them. Yet, as Lt Gen A S Kalkat, the Commander of the IPKF said ‘They came as proud soldiers. They leave as proud soldiers’. The contribution of the Indian soldiers was belatedly recognized by the Sri Lankan government by the erection of monument near Colombo, commemorating their role in their country. It bears the names of all 1157 Indians who fell during the operations. Another smaller monument at Palaly near Jaffna commemorates the Indian sacrifices there.
The inconclusive operations has shaped our reluctance to wage overseas operations thereafter. It had another fall-out. In May 91, former Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by a LTTE suicide bomber for his role in sending the IPKF into Sri Lanka, changing the political equations of the country completely.