The Deal
On 9 March, the newly elected Afghan President Ashraf Ghani was taking the oath in the Parliamentary lawns at Kabul. Just a block away, his rival Abdullah Abdullah was conducting his own swearing in ceremony as President, insisting that he had won the elections. The farcical situation was rudely jolted when rockets exploded in the vicinity, forcing both to flee for cover and underlined the rude reality of Afghanistan in the new post deal scenario.
On Leap Day, 29 Feb, Zalmay Khalilzad, the US Special Representative and Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the political head of the Taliban had signed a historic deal in Doha to bring an end to the 19-year-old war which has claimed over 2500 US and allied lives, over 80,000 civilians and cost over $800 Billion in treasure. It was not a “Peace Deal’ as it was called. It was more a “Troop Pullout Deal”. The US and its allies agreed to withdraw all troops from Afghanistan by June 2021 with an initial reduction from the present level of 14000 to 8600 within 135 days. In return the Taliban promised not to attack foreign troops and “prevent terrorist groups or individuals from using Afghan soil to threaten the US or its allies.” The US would also work to remove UN sanctions on the Taliban within three months. The four-page document signed between the ‘Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan’ and the US, left out the legitimate Afghan government who were not even party to the deal. Their only tangible gain was a ten-day period of ‘reduction of violence’ and a vague assurance that talks would begin between the Afghan government and the Taliban after the deal was signed. There was no mention of a cease fire or any cessation of activity against Afghan forces.
The Afghan government has been left in the lurch as the US worked out its own agreement with the Taliban to leave the country. A resurgent Taliban – who now control over 52% of the country – can step up their offensive at will and dictate terms to the new government which is already hobbled by its internal dissensions. The key to achieving durable peace in Afghanistan lies in a ‘Afghan-led, Afghan owned and Afghan controlled’ process, spearheaded by the legitimate government which can arrive at some kind of power -sharing arrangement with the Taliban. But the government is already split in its ranks and not even recognized as such by the Taliban. If talks do take place, it will be a long and convoluted process in which everything will be up for grabs – from the status of women in the new regime, education, ethnic distribution, share in defense and security, religious norms and even if the name of the nation is to be ‘Republic’ or ‘Emirate’ of Afghanistan- and on each issue, it would be the Taliban that holds sway.
The Taliban are Stronger than ever Before
But that is if the talks do take place at all. The first hurdle has already arisen in the prisoner swap. As per the deal, 5000 Taliban, including 1500 hardcore fighters, held in Afghan jails were to be released in exchange for 1000 government personnel held by the Taliban. This disproportionate clause was inserted without consulting the Afghan government and President Ghani was completely against it. The swap was to be completed by 10 March – the dates intra-Afghan talks were supposed to have started – but has been stalled by both sides. That contentious clause may just stymie any future Afghan talks.
Even the so-called ‘reduction in violence’ promised by the Taliban dissipated before the ink had even dried on the agreement. Just two days after the signing a massive bomb blast claimed 27 lives in the heart of Kabul. Even as US troops were vacating their bases in Helmand and Herat, the Taliban launched a coordinated series of 33 attacks in 16 different provinces on Afghan security forces forcing the US to launch air strikes in support of the beleaguered Afghan troops. This is an indicator as to how fast things could unravel and perhaps the deal itself will not hold.
The Taliban, in any case, have come out the winner and have been celebrating their ‘victory’ over another superpower. The US withdrawal, whether as per the schedule of the deal or delayed a little is bound to happen. President Trump has no appetite for the campaign and is keen on getting US troops back home in time for his re-election campaign. Nor is long-term stability in Afghanistan one of his priorities. The stage is set for the US withdrawal, but that will not signal an end of the conflict– but rather a beginning. A beginning of another phase in Afghanistan’s endless cycle of war, which could have grave repercussion for the country and the region.
Implications
The Peace deal is a fig leaf designed to disguise the US surrender and enable them to get their troops back home. It has ceded victory to the Taliban and handed the country over to them on a platter. The moral ascendency is now with the Taliban and the basic US goal – the removal of the Taliban and their terrorist infrastructure – remains unattained. Even the few gains of the war – Democracy and human rights – are now under threat of being slowly dismantled.
Deal or Defeat?
We have to prepare for the fact that the Taliban will be back in power in Afghanistan – either by storming into the capital as in 1996, or by being the dominant partner in a power-sharing arrangement with a lame duck government. India will have to deal with them, but historically, our relations with the Taliban are poor. We have never recognized them, nor have we had any dealings with them, except during the ill-fated hijacking of IC 814 to Kandahar. Yet, the government is making its first tentative outreach to them, and the presence of our Foreign Secretary at the signing of the deal is an indicator of the realization that we would need to engage them more in the future.
While establishing contact with the Taliban, we have to also continue with our policy of supporting the legitimately elected government and prop up Ashraf Ghani as best as we can. Our humanitarian and developmental work in Afghanistan has earned us a reservoir of goodwill, but that may dissipate if the Taliban come in. There have been feelers that India should position troops in Afghanistan, but that move can boomerang badly and should be avoided. Yet we have to ensure that our $3 Billion worth of investments there are secure. The Parliament building, Kabul’s electrical grid, schools, the network of roads and other symbols of Indian presence are all in danger of being targeted under a hostile regime. More than anything else, the future of Chahbahar port is at stake. This is the linchpin of our Afghanistan policy and its success depends on the land link from Afghanistan to the port. Should this not be provided the entire project will come to naught and we will be denied access to Afghanistan once again.
Pakistan’s position there is stronger than at any time since 2001. It has earned brownie points with the US for facilitating the deal and a US-Pakistan rapprochement is underway. In any case the Taliban is indebted to it for bringing it to power and then sheltering its leadership after the US invasion. The deal thanks Pakistan for its role and It is significant that though it talks of Taliban action against Al Qaeda and the Islamic State it makes no mention of Pakistani sponsored groups like the Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed. Should there be a return to the 1996 days with a Taliban government calling the shots, it is quite likely that they will repay the favor by action in Kashmir. An influx of Afghan fighters in the valley is very much on the cards. The internal policies of the Indian government like its clampdown in Kashmir, the CAA-CRC-NRC cocktail and the communal violence that followed could also be exploited by a rabidly Islamic Taliban to harden its anti-India stance. A Pakistan-Taliban alliance to remove Indian influence from Afghanistan, target our interests there, and carry the battle into Kashmir is very much on the cards.
Whether the US-Taliban deal unravels or holds remains to be seen. It may not stand the test of Time, but there will definitely be some kind of reduction of troops. Even if US troops do remain in a truncated manner, we and the region should be prepared for the imminent return of the Taliban. That will be dangerous for Afghanistan and the entire region, but cannot be wished away. We have to prepare for that scenario, make an out-reach to them, hedge our bets and cater for the different contingencies that can arise with a hostile regime in Afghanistan. A radical change to our Afghan policy should definitely be on the anvil.
Ajay Singh
Ajay Singh has authored four books and over 170 articles.