In Balti they call it as Siachen – the abode of wild roses. It is a strange name for an icy glacier, 19,000 feet above sea level, where not a blade of grass grows. It is stranger still that this silent, ice-shrouded land, should become the highest battleground of the world, where guns have roared since April 1984. Even today, though the guns are silent, Indian and Pakistani armies remain locked in eyeball to eyeball confrontation in these forbidding heights.
The roots of the conflict go back to the 1949 Karachi Agreement signed after the ceasefire of the 1947-48 Indo-Pak War (See “The Race to Srinagar” and ‘Saving Kashmir” ). This demarcated the ceasefire line between India and Pakistan at map coordinate NJ9842 at the foot of the Siachen glacier. Beyond this the line ran ‘thence north to the glaciers’. This ambiguous lines was interpreted by Pakistan as running Northeast towards the Karakorum Pass, which gave it control over the glaciers. India claimed that from NJ9842 the line ran along the nearest watershed, the Saltoro Ridge which put Siachen into Indian territory.
Indian and Pakistani claim lines
Through all of the 50s, 60s and 70s this barren, inhospitable region was ignored by both sides. It was only in the late 70s that Pakistan published maps showing the area as theirs. They also began issuing permits for mountaineering expeditions, often accompanied by a Liaison Officer of the Pak army, de facto claiming the area as their own.
India awoke to this gambit thanks to the efforts of Col Narender ‘Bull’ Kumar, a skilled mountaineer and Commandant of the High Altitude Warfare School. He laid hands on the map which showed the area as Pakistan’s and decided to counter the Pak moves by launching mountaineering expeditions of his own. After much persuasion, he received permission to lead his own expedition in 1978. The expedition detected huge quantum of debris with Pak Army markings, which convinced him that Pakistan was subtly laying claim to the glacier. He decided to counter Pak Oropolitics (use of mountaineering expeditions to stake claim) by a series of Indian expeditions and in 1981, led a 70 man team across the glacier which was tailed by a Pakistani helicopter. Both sides were now awakening to the importance of the glacier.
The Indian expeditions had alarmed the Pakistani planners at GHQ, Rawalpindi, who now decided to occupy the glacier by military force. The aim of the operation was to occupy the heights of Saltoro Ridge, and its main passes of Sia La and Bilafond La and Gyong La. Yet, they made a small but significant error. They ordered large quantities of Arctic weather gear from a supplier in London who was also supplied the Indian Army and he tipped them off about the large Pakistani order. That set off alarm bells in the Indian Northern Command who now were convinced that Pakistan was planning something in Siachen.
India began procuring its own Arctic equipment to pre-empt the Pakis by occupying Siachen before they did. Intelligence reports stated that they were likely to move in around 17 April and it was decided to move in our own troops by 13 April. Though considered an unlucky day, it was Baisakhi, and the Pakistanis would be least expecting activity on this day. 4 KUMAON and troops from Ladakh Scouts – hardy troops from the mountain regions, were selected for the operation, codenamed OPERATION MEGHDOOT, after Kalidasa’s famous poem.
Around end March, troops of 4 KUMAON and Ladakh Scouts marched out in full battle order through the Zojila Pass towards the base of the glacier. Simultaneously, MI-17 and Chetak helicopters carried provisions to be deployed along the route and began stocking up the base camps. Four teams were deployed for the task under Brigadier V N Channa, who was responsible for the operation. One was to occupy Bilafond La, the other Sia La and the third moved towards Gyong La, the three passes leading to the glacier from the Pakistani side. Simultaneously the positions on the high ground of Saltoro Ridge were to be occupied to deny access to the glacier. Once these positions were occupied, it would be virtually impossible for an enemy to evict them from these heights.
Indian troops assembling for the Siachen Operation
The troops marched up to the base camps in secrecy for the next phase of move to the heights. Yet, the Arctic equipment which was essential for survival at these altitudes, and which was being specially procured from across the world for this operation, was delayed. The first sets reached the base camps only around 5 in the evening on 12 April 84. (In the final briefing before the operation, the troops agreed to move up even if the Arctic gear was not available). Next morning, on 13 April, Maj R S Sandhu led his platoon on foot to the heights of Saltoro Ridge, being the first Indian officer to be deployed there. Simultaneously, at 0530h a Cheetah helicopter, piloted by Squadron Leader SS Bains, took off from the base camp, carrying Capt Sanjay Kulkarni and his radio operator and winged its way towards the Bilafond La pass. The helicopter could only carry two persons and in the wind-swept conditions could not land at the snow covered heights.The Cheetah hovered a few feet from the ground, Capt Kulkarni and his operator said a small prayer and jumped, their fall cushioned by the soft snow. 17 such sorties took place, and by around ten, around 30 men, a platoon worth, was on Bilafond La. In a raging blizzard, the Indian tricolor was raised there for the first time.
Yet, the first day was a forerunner of things to come. In just three hours, the radio operator contracted pulmonary odeoma, and had to be evacuated. By noon the weather packed up as well, making any operations towards Sia La and the other heights impossible. In heights of over 19,000 feet, another soldier, Lance Naik Ramesh Singh fell to the dreaded high altitude illness and passed away on 16 April. Although radio transmission was strictly forbidden, Capt Kulkarni, made a single transmission to his HQ informing them of his situation. That transmission was picked up by the Pakistani and now they were alerted. In spite of the terrible weather they too began moving troops of their elite Special Services Group and Northern Light Infantry on foot towards the glacier.
After three day, the weather cleared and on 17 April the IAF launched 32 sorties to drop Major Bahuguna and his platoon of Ladakh Scouts in the vicinity of the next objective, Sia La Pass. The platoon walked five kilometers in knee high snow and secured the pass by mid-day. Indian troops also occupied important heights around Saltoro Ridge and the glacier was securely in Indian hands.
The Pakistanis had been beaten in their plans to occupy the glacier by three days. They now launched their own operation –Codenamed OPERATION ABABEEL – to evict the Indians. SSG commandoes reached Bilafond La on 23 April, after a three day trek on the snow and around 4 in the evening the first attack came in. A burst of fire killed the Indian sentry at the Observation Post and the silent peaks reverberated with the sounds of gunfire. Yet the Indians were on high ground, and held the advantage. For the Pakistanis, movement in the knee-deep snow was slow and tortuous and their attack was repulsed with 26 Pakistani soldiers were killed in the first assault. Another attack came in the next day, and then again on 27 April which was similarly repulsed. Other attacks followed in May and in June, on each of the newly established Indian posts but to no avail. The Indian positions were being gradually reinforced day by day and at these altitudes recapturing a high ground was virtually impossible. Pakistani attacks, though courageous were simply beaten back.
Over the next few months, both sides built up their forces. With the passes in Indian control, the Pakistanis tried to seize the adjoining heights. Both sides set about occupying posts to dominate the other – a strategy that continued throughout the war. In July 84, Pakistani NSG commandoes seized a high feature overlooking the Bilafond La pass in a daring helicopter borne assault and occupied it. This feature renamed Quaid Post, dominated Indian positions for over three years, till it was recaptured in July 1987 by Naib Subedar Bana Singh. (see ‘From Quaid to Bana’ ) and renamed Bana Post.
The Pakistani Army did not give up its attempts to recapture Siachen. Chastened by its failure to defend Siachen (Benazir Bhutto called “only fit to fight its own people” and suggested that its generals wear bangles.) A series of attacks and counterattacks on each other’s positions continued for over a decade, with major Pakistani offensives launched in 1987,1989, 1992, 1995 which were repulsed with heavy casualties. In 1999 General Musharaff launched the Kargil War, hoping to cut off the supply line to Siachen and force India to vacate their positions. (He himself was a Brigade Commander there and the failures suffered there would have rankled.) The Kargil operation too failed (See ‘The Heights of Victory’)
Both sides have around 3000 troops in 150 – 200 small posts in the crucial heights and the line held by both sides has become The Actual Ground Positions Line. (ACPL) The Indians hold on to the 76 kilometer long glacier, and occupy most of the heights and passes around it. Even though the guns have been silent since June 2003 after a Ceasefire, appalling weather conditions and the treacherous terrain claim casualties on both sides. In 2012 an avalanche hit the Pakistani Gayari base killing 126 soldiers. 10 Indian soldiers were recently buried alive in a similar landslide in 2016. Over 2000 casualties have taken place on either side. The cost of just maintaining a presence there is around $300 Million a year for India and around $200 Million for Pakistan. They have the logistical advantage of being located at the Western base of the glacier which can be accessed by roads. Indian posts, even today, largely rely on helicopters for sustenance.
So, is it worth holding on to these inhospitable heights? Yes it is. Vacating the hard-earned positions at Siachen will simply allow the Pakis to move in and then regaining them will be impossible. Siachen also will prevent a Chinese – Pakistani nexus in the area. And it already holds an important position in the psyche of both nations. For a permanent solution to Siachen, clearly marked and delineated boundaries along the AGPL with iron-clad guarantees would be required, something difficult in the environment of distrust. But till the solution is found, the Indian soldier holds vigil in those forbidding heights, suffering hardships that would have broken most armies. And all we can do is raise a prayer and a salute for him.
